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This paper, based on my dissertation (Verspoor 
1990), deals with the selectional properties of English 
matrix verbs pertinent in complement selection. After 
explaining the rationale of this study, I will present 
a semantic framework for the analysis of complement-
taking matrix verbs, based on Palmer (1986). According 
to this semantic analysis, matrix verbs that belong to 
the same semantic category may select among structures 
that are syntactically different (see 1 a and b) and 
that matrix verbs that belong to different semantic 
categories may select structures with similar surface 





I believe that he is guilty 
I believe him to be guilty 
(finite clause) 
(non-finite) 
I ~ him walk 
I ~ him walk 
(epistemic verb) 
(deontic verb) 
I have found that these apparently paradoxical 
facts may be· explained by the fact that, in addition to 
the semantic class to which the matrix verb belongs, 
the type of causal relationship (based on Searle's 
theory of intentionality) between the action/state 
expressed by the matrix verb and its complement is 
pertinent in complement selection. 
Before starting this study, I had noticed that 
many constructions containing an imperative, a modal 
auxiliary, or a subjunctive verb had alternate .tQ 
infinitive structures: 
(3) He went to the store so that he might buy 
some milk/ .tQ_b_~ some milk 
(4) Mr Johnson is the man whom you should speak 
to/ to speak to 
(5) I asked what I should do/what ~ 
(6) It is necessary that he 9.Q/for him tQ_gQ 
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Because many :tQ infinitive structures may alter-
nate with finite clauses containing modal auxiliaries 
or subjunctive verbs, I speculated that the .t.Q infini-
tive might be related to the use of modal auxiliaries. 
I found two distinct categories, the :t.Q infinitive 
after verbs expressing a belief or opinion behaving 
differently from the .tQ infinitive after verbs of 
planning. A 'belief' matrix verb often selects a ~ 
complement, which may sometimes alternate with a small-
clause type of complement. Also, such a complement 
usually refers to a state of affairs that occurs before 
or at the same time as the psychological mode expressed 
by the main verb. 
(7) a. I believe that he is a thief 
b. I believe him to be a thief 
(8) a. I believe that he has been a thief 
b. I believe him to have been a thief 
(9) a. I consider him to be a thief 
b. I consider him a thief 
Verbs of planning, on the other hand, select 
infinitives that refer to a time that is in the future 
relative to the time expressed by the main verb. Also, 
such verbs do not usually select small clause comple-
ments. 
(10) a. I plan to go home tomorrow 
b. I plan to be a doctor 
c. * I plan a doctor 
on the strength of these differences, I divided 
the verbs complemented by tQ infinitive constructions 
into two groups: those that express an opinion and 
those that express a volitional action. Then I sought a 
clearer definition of modality in Palmer's work (1986), 
one of the most recent and extensive studies on mood 
and modality. I noticed that my postulated categories 
of 'opinion' and •volitional action' coincided with 
Palmer's main modal categories: 
epistemic: 
deontic: 
those that report a state of affairs 
those that report a volitional action 
and those that evaluate an idea 
This correlation encouraged me to further inves-
tigate the idea that a t.Q. infinitive structure might 
indeed be regarded as a modal marker, very much like an 
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auxiliary of modality or a subjunctive verb. Act.ually, 
not only the t.Q infinitive but also the plain infini-
tive and -.i.ng forms often occur in English where other 
languages might use a subjunctive form (Palmer 1986: et 
passim). For example, in many languages, verbs of 
perception--which in English may be followed by a plain 
infinitive construction (I saw him walk)--are modal 
predicators (Palmer 1986: 165). Also, Palmer's evalua-
tives, which include verbs such as ~, can be 
followed by gerunds in English (119-121). Moreover, 
many, but not all, non-finite structures have alternate 
that clause structures, and many, but not all, tbJ!.t 
clause structures have non-finite alternates. There-
fore, I decided to include plain infinitive, -.ing, and 
finite (indicative, modal, and subjunctive) clause 
complement structures in my study. 
The following examples show that all the struc-
tures mentioned may be selected by epistemi~ as well as 
deontic matrix verbs. 
Finite thslt. clauses: 
Epistemic He announced that she had arrived on time 
He believed that she had arrived on time 
Deontic He insisted that John arrive on time 
He t2.lJl John that he should arrive on time 
l'.Q infinitive constructions: 
Epistemic He believed himself to be on time 
Deon tic 
He plaimed to have arrived on time 
He p[etended to have arrived on time 
He ~ (for John) to arrive on time 
He ordeted John to arrive on time 
He promised John to arrive on time 
Plain infinitive constructions: 
Epistemic He ~ her leave on time 
Deontic He ~ her leave on time 
Ing constructions: 
Epistemic He ~ Mary walking home 
He temembeted Mary singing 
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Deon tic He continued walking fast 
He advised walking slowly 
He enioyed walking 
He considered walking 
He imagined walking 
He regretted walking 
Small clause constructions: 
Epistemic He considered them late 
He pronounced them man and wife 
Deon tic He ~ them in the house 
The terms epistemic and deontic are quite common 
in linguistics. Palmer, however, uses each in a much 
wider sense than usual and they are therefore discussed 
in more detail. Palmer argues that besides the commonly 
recognized notion of weak to strong possibility, the 
epistemic category should include expressions that 
indicate the type of evidence a person has for what he 
says. Therefore epistemic modality should include 
evidentials such as 'hearsay' or 'report' (the Quota-
tive) and the evidence of the senses (51), which are 
"devices for the speaker to indicate that he wishes to 
modify his commitment to the truth of what is being 
said" (57). 
Judgments and evidentials, each in turn, have two 
subcategories (confidence/inference and hearsay/other 
perception respectively) so that there are four ways to 
indicate that the speaker or reporter is not presenting 
what he is saying as a fact. Judgments are propositions 
that express the notions of possibility, probability, 
and necessity (in the sense of strong possibility), 
indicating that the speaker is speculating about a 
state of affairs (confidence) (see example 11) or that 
the speaker is presenting a state of affairs as a 
deduction (inference) (see example 12). Because English 
does not express these categories in main clauses, 
Palmer illustrates them with that. clauses after verbs 
or adjectives expressing modality. 
(11) It is possible that •.• /I think that •.. 
(12) It is to be concluded that •.. / I conclude 
that •.• 
Evidentials are propositions qualified in terms of 
the available evidence with which the speaker may 
indicate that he has been told about a state of affairs 
399 
400 
1 9 9 0 MAL C 
Ver spoor 
(hearsay) (see example 13) or that a state of affairs 
is a matter only of appearance, based on the evidence 
of other possibly fallible senses (other perception) 
(see example 14). 
(13) It is said that .•. / X said that 
(14) It appears that 
Palmer (96) uses the term 'deontic' also in a 
wider sense than usual. He includes the types of modal-
ity characterized by Jespersen (1924: 320-1) as "co-
ntaining an element of will," which he groups into 
three general categories (directives, commissives, and 
volitives). He also adds a fourth, evaluatives, unre-
lated to willingness. Palmer notes that--besides being 
subjective propositions--directives, commissives, and 
volitives are always related to the future because at 
the time of speaking a speaker can initiate only future 
action (97). 
Directives are statements meant to initiate action 
by others or the speaker, including imperative state-
ments, which express in the most neutral way the notion 




Leave (command or 'mand') 
John may/must leave (permission/obligation) 
Commissives are statements with which the speaker 
commits himself to an action and range from promises to 
threats, with the difference between these two deter-
mined by what the speaker wants. 
(16) a. 
b. 
I will leave now (promise or threat) 
You shall go to the circus (promise) 
Volitives are statements with which a speaker express 
wishes and feelings and include attitudes of fear, 
hope, and regret (Palmer 1986: 116-118). 
(17) May he arrive on time (wish) 
Evaluatives are statements with which a speaker expres-
ses attitudes towards known facts. They include expres-
sions of failure, expectation, surprise, disappoint-
ment, approval, disapproval, and regret (Palmer 1986: 
119). 
(18) That he should do such a thing! 
(surprise, annoyance, regret) 
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A consideration of the English language indicates 
that matrix verbs expressing all the kinds of modality 
that Palmer has established can select both finite and 
non-finite complements (:tQ infinitive, plain infini-
tive, -.ing form, and small clause [NP XPJ complements) 






I believe that he is honest 
I believe him to be honest 
I consider him honest 
ii Inference 
I fo~nd that he was guilty 
I found him to be guilty 




He claimed that he was sick 
He claimed to be sick 
ii other Perception 
I saw that he walked home 
I saw him walk home 
A Containing an element of will 
i Directive 
I told John that he should leave 
He permitted John to leave 
He made John leave 
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ii Commissive 
He promised that he would leave 
He threatened to leave 
iii Volitives 
He hopes that he will leave soon 
He hopes to leave soon 
B Not containing an element of will 
He regretted that he had left early 
He regretted having left early 
Because I found that Palmer's semantic classes 
themselves can not account for a choice among the al-
ternate complement structures, I decided to examine 
Searle (1983), whose approach "provides a useful seman-
tic framework for the discussion of modality" (Palmer 
1986: 13). Besides noticing a great many similarities 
between Palmer's modal and Searle's Intentional catego-
ries, I found that several of Searle's observations--
intentionality in perception and action; similarities 
among commissives, directives, and intentions; distin-
guishing prior intention from intention in action; and 
distinguishing between direction of causation--might be 
pertinent not only to understanding modality but also 
to complement selection. 
What became the.crucial argument to my study, 
however, is Searle's postulate that there is 'caus-
ation' in every Intentional state as I found that a 
non-finite structure is possible only when there is a 
causally relevant relationship between the action or 
state expressed by the matrix verb and state of af-
fairs, event, or action expressed by the complement 
clause. For example, in English, the choice between a 
finite versus a non-finite complement clause may depend 
on whether or not the subject of the matrix verb has a 
direct causal relation to the event expressed in the 
complement: In (21 b) the subject can directly prove 
the state of affairs expressed by the complement, but 
in (21 c) the subject cannot. 
(19) a. The doctor/test proved that she was pregnant 
b. The test proved her (to be) pregnant. 
c. * The doctor proved her pregnant. 
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Also, in English, the type of complement after a 
verb of perception indicates whether the perception is 
directly caused by the event expressed in the comple-
ment clause or not. A finite clause may express that 
there was indirect evidence (causation). A non-finite 
complement is possible only when there is direct per-
ception. 
(20) a. I saw him read a book 
b. * Because the light was on, I saw him read a 
book 
Searle uses the term 'causation' very broadly. In 
many instances, his use of 'caused by' could be inter-
preted as 'determined by' or 'brought about by.' Depar-
ting from standard theories of causal explanation 
(which I will not go into), Searle (119-124) argues 
that 'intentional causation' is involved in all cases 
of intentionality because we can directly experience 
the causal relations whenever we perceive or act. For 
example, in perception the object directly causes the 
perceptual experience; in action, our mental state 
directly causes the action. 
The close semantic connection between action and 
perception is reflected in the complement structures of 




I ~ him walking 
I SlY2.lJi walking 
Causation--which is part of the content of an 
action or perception experience (130)--is more intimat-
ely related to action and perception than, for example, 
to 'prior intentions' and 'belief'. Searle points out 
that 'intentions in action' should be distinguished 
from 'prior intentions.' An intention in action might 
be expressed with 11 1 am doing A, 11 whereas a prior 
intention might be expressed with "I will do A" or "I 
am going to do A." In the example "I suddenly hit a 
man, 11 the intention was in the action, because it was 
not premeditated. Therefore, there was no prior inten-
tion (84). In English, a present 'intention in action' 
is expressed by means of a present progressive and two 
simultaneous 'intentions in action' might be illustrat-
ed with I continued writing, in which the complemen~ of 
tne matrix verb also is the -in.g form. 
If my assumption that a syntactic form is indica-
tive of its semantic function is correct, then two of 
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searle's observations--'immediateness' and 'conditions 
of satisfaction that are met'--are important criteria 
for complement selection. With a verb of perception,· 
'immediateness' means that the action of 'seeing,' 
'hearing,' or 'feeling' and the action/event expressed 
in the complement are simultaneous. 'Conditions of 
satisfaction that are met' imply implicativity. In 
English, verbs of perception may be followed among 
other structures by an NP + plain infinitive or -i.ng 
form. so are other verbs of Intentional reports that 
show immediate causation (simultaneity and implicativi-
ty). On the other hand, when verbs of Intentional state 
or linguistic report imply that the action will take 
place at a future moment, and are therefore inherently 
[- immediate], they are usually followed by a .tQ in-
finitive. 
(22) a. I ~ him walk [+ imm] 
b. I ~ him walking [+ imm] 
(23) a. I .rulQig walking [+ imm] 
b. I ~ to walk [- imm] 
(24) a. I ~ him walk [+ imm] 
b. I tQ.lQ. him to walk [- imm] 
Searle states that with a prior intention an agent 
acts on his intention, carries out his intention, or 
tries to carry it out; but 'intentions in action' 
cannot be separated into 'intentions and actions' (84). 
It seems to me that the feature relevant in complement 
selection {immediate] is inherent to the distinction 
between 'prior intention' and 'intention in action.' 
For example, ~ would imply a prior intention 
(referring to a future action; [- imm]) and~ an 
intention in action (referring to a simultaneous non-
action; [+ imm]). 
(25) a. I ~ to go [- imm] prior intention 
b. I SlYQ.i!:j jogging [+ imm] intention in action 
A belief about a state of affairs consists of two 
separate entities--the belief and the state of affairs-
-and the conditions of satisfaction are met only when 
the state of affairs, a separate entity, is as I belie-
ve it to be. The close semantic connection between 
belief and prior intention, the fact that both have a 
less immediate connection to a state of affairs than 
perception or an intention in action, is also reflected 
in the complement structures of the relevant verbs; 
both may be followed by -t.Q infinitive structures: 
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I believe him to be sick 
I tQld him to walk 
I §.fil'.l him walking 





'Prior intention' and 'memory' are also related. 
Both are representations (in the literal sense of 
'present again'). For example, in "I remember seeing a 
flower" I represent (present again) the event "I see a 
flower" and implies that there was an event of seeing 
the flower and that this event now causes my remembran-
ce. In "I intend to raise my arm," I represent the 
event "I am raising my arm" and implies that there 
(probably) will be an event of raising my arm (97). The 
difference in syntactic structures after verbs express-
ing a prior intention or a memory (which is very much 
like perception and imagination) may be explained by 
the fact that a prior intention represents a possible 
future event and is therefore [- immediate]. On the 
other hand, a remembrance is caused immediately by a 
mental image re-presenting an actual past event. 
(28) a. 
b. 
I in.t.mld to raise my arm 
I reme!Uber raising my arm 
[- imm] 
[+ imm) 
Searle also points out that there is a close 
connection between 'intentional actions' and what one 
can tell people to do. When one gives orders, one 
orders people to perform intentional actions; one can 
only order people to do things that they can do inten-
tionally 81). The fact that .t2 infinitives occur to 
report prior intentions as well as orders supports this 
close semantic connection: 
(29) a. I HSlilt to go (report of prior intention) 
b. I HSlilt you to go (report of ·order) 
c. I promise you to go (report of promise) 
d. * I HSlilt going 
According to Searle, mental acts are similar to 
physical acts. They are different only in that a purely 
mental event, instead of a bodily movement, occurs as a 
condition of satisfaction. For example, if I intend to 
form a mental image of the Eiffel tower and I do, t~e 
relevant portion of the intention in action will be 
that this intention in action causes me to have a 
mental image of the Eiffel tower 103). Because forming 
a mental image is an intention in action and involves 
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no prior intention, the causation is [immediate]. 
Again, the similar syntactic complement structures 
support this hypothesis. 
( 30) a. 
b. 
I imagined climbing the Eiffel Tower 
[+ imm] 
I considered climbing the Eiffel Tower 
(+ imm] 
Evaluatives, as defined by Palmer, express an 
attitude towards an actual present or past event or 
state of affairs. Verbs reporting these evaluatives 
often select an -.ing complement, as do other reports of 
actual present or past events or states of affairs. 
Again the feature [immediate causation] seems to be a 
pertinent criterion in complement selection. It is 
either the actual event or state of affairs, which 
occurs at the same moment as the utterance is made, or 
the mental representation of the event or state of 




I regretted step.ping on your toe 
[ + ilnm ca us] 
I remember stepping on your toe 
[+ imm caus] 
I ~ him stepping on your toe 
[+ imm caus] 
In addition, verbs reporting attitudes towards 




I ~ swimming 
I swimming 
I ~ leaving 
Also, verbs reporting evaluations of (rather than 




I considered going 
I ~ going 
Therefore, I would like to argue that evaluatives 
should include not only attitudes towards an actual 
present or past event but also evaluations (by the 
speaker or listener) of possible future events. 
In conclusion, I have argued that once we recog-
nize searle's notions of [direct causation], which may 
be [±immediate], we can account for the fact that 
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verbs belonging to the same semantic class may select 
among alternate structures. Table 2 gives a brief 
overview of lexical verbs selecting non-finite comple-
ments. It suggests that the primary criterion in com-
plement selection might be [causation]. When the logi-
cal relationship between the Intentional state/act 
expressed by the matrix verb and the action/event/state 
of affairs expressed by the complement is on of direct 
and immediate causation, the matrix verb selects either 
a plain infinitive or an -i.ng complement; if the logi-
cal relationship is direct, but non-immediate, the 
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